Night vision in combat operations: history, technology and tactics

The goal of avoiding wars and conflicts is not new, and the efforts of engineers and scientists are aimed at achieving it. The shortest path to such a future is the development of technology, weapons and new methods of warfare. It is the system of checks and balances that arises from such development that ensures relative balance in the complex and often aggressive global socio-political system.

Obvious examples of this are North Korea's nuclear weapons or Iran's nuclear program. They force much more developed states to engage in dialogue with these regimes, despite their isolationist or authoritarian policies. Another example is Russia, which positions itself as the heir to the Soviet empire and acts like Nazi Germany.

russia wages aggressive wars against weaker neighbors and demonstrates openly hostile and primitive behavior in international diplomacy. Annexation of territories of other states and nuclear threats have become its instruments of influence. Nevertheless, it continues to be negotiated with, as it inherited the USSR's nuclear arsenal and has a large, albeit technically backward, army. It is through mutual threats and deterrence that the current balance of power in the world is maintained.

Nuclear weapons are not the only instrument of intimidation in modern warfare. Military power today is much more complex and multifaceted. Its main weapon is fear, which acts as a psychological lever and has deep roots in the historical memory of absolute evil.

An illustrative example is the battle near Hasham, where the US army killed more than 500 Russian mercenaries and Syrian soldiers. The uniqueness of the situation was that the operation was completely remote: only helicopters, drones, and aircraft participated - not a single American soldier on the ground. This factor was decisive: the enemy no longer dared to take such actions. The threat from the air, invisible and inescapable, was much more frightening than the usual battle.

Fear arises not because of the lethality of weapons, but because of uncertainty. The enemy does not know when and how retaliation will come, but he is sure that it is inevitable. It is this feeling that becomes a key factor in the conduct of war - and at the same time a means of saving lives.

Human vision has significant limitations, especially in low-light conditions. When it gets dark or when visibility is impaired, a person loses orientation, which causes anxiety and fear. This vulnerability of vision is one of the oldest and most stable human weaknesses.

For thousands of years, the capabilities of human vision have remained unchanged: it is ineffective at dusk and at night. The body tries to compensate for this by enhancing auditory perception, but even hearing does not provide sufficient accuracy for orientation in the dark.

Darkness on the battlefield: how night changed the course of battles in different eras

A historical example is the events of 1180 in Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan. During the confrontation between the Heike and Genji forces near the Fuji River, the Heike warriors who were camped on the bank panicked and left their positions at night. They mistook the sounds of waterfowl for the approach of an enemy force. This case illustrates how limited night vision can affect combat effectiveness

Nighttime in combat operations causes a deep fear of the unknown that is difficult to control. This psychological effect often surpasses even the threat of nuclear weapons, the consequences of which can be calculated and countermeasures planned. For example, there are algorithms for dealing with a nuclear threat, such as the "duck and cover" method, which, although of questionable effectiveness, still create the illusion of control. Modern air defense systems and preemptive strike capabilities only increase this sense of security. At the same time, in the darkness, the lack of information and inability to see the enemy create unique tactical challenges that cannot be compensated for by any technology without the use of night vision devices.

During the Battle of Thermopylae, according to the historian Diodorus, the Spartans, realizing the inevitability of defeat in an open battle with a numerically superior Persian army, attempted a night attack. They infiltrated the enemy camp in order to kill King Xerxes. However, due to the size of the camp, they were unable to find his tent. As a result, a battle broke out that lasted until morning. All the Spartans were killed, but the Persians suffered significant losses.

Nighttime disorientation often changed the course of a battle in favor of the weaker side. For example, in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest, Germanic tribes destroyed a Roman army of up to 60,000 people. The Romans lost their orientation in the dark, which the Germans took advantage of, despite their much smaller numbers and weaker weapons.

The Battle of the Catalaunian Fields became a historical example of how the lack of visibility can affect the outcome of a clash, even with the participation of a well-trained Roman army. In the chaos of the night, the Romans lost their bearings, leading to the deaths of about 30,000 soldiers in a short battle. The culmination was the mistake of Rome's ally, Thorismund, the son of King Theodoric, who got lost and accidentally fell into the Huns' camp. The commander was wounded, but survived, which cannot be said about a large part of his unit.

At that time, there were no night vision devices or thermal imaging systems, so the use of darkness as a tactical resource was limited and often led to unpredictable consequences. Although situational night attacks did occur, their effectiveness was questionable due to high casualties and lack of control. In the Middle Ages, night actions were more often used during sieges of fortresses or long campaigns of attrition, but they were episodic and rarely affected the overall course of operations, which could last for years.

During the tense relations between Vlad Tepes and the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II, an event that went down in history as the night attack on Tirgoviste took place. According to the chronicles, Vlad disguised himself in Turkish clothes and infiltrated the enemy camp for reconnaissance. There he learned about the sultan's order to forbid the soldiers to leave their tents to avoid panic in case of an attack.

Using this information, Vlad organized a night attack on the Ottoman positions. Despite the losses, which, according to most historians, were three times higher than the Ottoman losses, the raiding party achieved a tactical advantage and disrupted the enemy's plans.

Military technology evolved, becoming more efficient and deadly, but this did not apply to the means of fighting at night or in conditions of limited visibility. Until the early 20th century, night operations remained much the same as in the Middle Ages: nineteenth-century cavalrymen had the same limitations as Viking warriors - the inability to detect the enemy in the dark or to defend against his hidden actions. The situation did not change until the First World War.

Technical innovations of night combat in the First World War

The First World War was a turning point in military history. Its scale, destructive consequences, and the psychological shock it caused were unprecedented. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the conflict, many people were enthusiastic about it. Young officers went to the front with the hope of rewards, promotions, and career advancement. Europe had not seen large-scale military operations for a long time, and the military culture and political system of many countries were closely linked to the officer corps. Therefore, the outbreak of war was perceived not as a catastrophe but as a chance to realize ambitions.

Scientific and technological progress has radically changed the nature of war. The notion of heroism and romance disappeared, and instead of cavalry attacks and drumming, solid trenches and mass destruction appeared. The participating countries used all available engineering and technical achievements adapted to the conditions of the front.

Poisonous gases with catastrophic consequences, machine guns that turned battles into massacres, and the first prototypes of tanks that already carried considerable firepower appeared. Less publicized, but no less important, were new forms of air warfare: German airships and planes carried out night bombings of London, the harbingers of the large-scale air terror of World War II. English "land battleships" became the forerunners of modern armored vehicles. Even small arms underwent a leap of several generations - the designs of many modern pistols originate from that period.

The importance of night combat has increased many times over. Modern combat conditions revealed the obsolescence of traditional military doctrine and the need for urgent technological changes. New challenges demanded immediate adaptation and innovation in tactics and technical support.

In a state of constant threat, when it is impossible to predict the enemy's actions, any advantage on the battlefield becomes critical. It quickly became apparent that whoever learned to operate effectively at night would have the advantage. Since the technical level of the parties to the conflict was roughly the same, this led to a protracted positional war with high moral and physical exhaustion of the personnel. Moisture, parasites, and psychological exhaustion became the main enemies of the soldiers.

The inability to conduct effective combat operations at night did not stop the command. In the absence of practical means for night detection of the enemy and covert surveillance of the area, simple alternatives were proposed. In particular, small arms received special types of ammunition - tracer and illuminating ammunition, which allowed for aimed fire in bursts even in conditions of limited visibility.

Illumination shells were used for night combat, creating temporary illumination of a combat zone or maneuver. They were launched from artillery systems, including howitzers. Structurally, these were shells filled with magnesium balls that created a light effect when they fell. The initial models had low efficiency and needed to be improved.

Later, modernized versions of such shells appeared, with parachutes that slowed their fall and provided longer and more intense illumination. This allowed for better orientation on the battlefield in the dark.

Tracer ammunition became available to infantry around the same time. They allowed for effective fire adjustment both at night and during the day. Typically, a tracer round was loaded after three or four conventional rounds, and when fired, it left a bright light trajectory that visualized the direction of fire.

The large-scale tragedy of World War I, exacerbated by the Spanish flu pandemic, was supposed to be a decisive lesson for humanity. And it did, although not in the form that was hoped for.

World War II. German infrared devices and tactical advantage in night battles

After the First World War, when Germany was limited by the Treaty of Versailles and forced to pay significant reparations, other victorious states focused on the development of military technologies. Military conflicts demonstrated the effectiveness of technical means in combat, which stimulated further research in the field of weapons and surveillance.

The early 20th century was a period of intense technological progress in the military sphere. The countries involved in conflicts came to a common conclusion: superiority on the battlefield depends on technological superiority, in particular in the means of detecting and defeating the enemy in conditions of limited visibility.

Despite the severe restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and the economic crisis caused by reparations, Germany became a leader in the development of advanced technologies. The growth of revanchist sentiment in the Weimar Republic was accompanied by covert cooperation with the Soviet Union. It was this cooperation that provided the Germans with access to resources for officer training, weapons development, and funding for research programs.

The promise of night vision has stimulated intensive investment in technology development. For example, Zeiss-Jena created a system capable of recognizing objects at a distance of up to 4 km. However, its size and power consumption were excessive even for heavy tanks such as the Tiger.

Operation Spring Awakening, 1945.

The development of night vision systems has also intensified in other countries. The USSR also experimented with night vision technologies, in particular with devices such as the PNB-1, which were mounted on Mosin rifles. However, these systems had limited effectiveness and were not widely used in combat.

In some publications by contemporary Russian historians, there are exaggerated claims about the level of development of Soviet night vision technologies. In particular, it is claimed that as early as 1940, the USSR had thermal imagers and electronic-optical converters. As "proof", they cite photographs of people in gear with flashlights and incomprehensible devices that have no technical evidence and do not correspond to real samples of military equipment of the time.

The Battle of Lake Balaton in 1945, Operation Spring Awakening, was a practical testament to the lack of effective Soviet equipment for night combat. In this operation, German troops used night sights such as the ZG 1229 Vampir, while the Soviet army had no comparable night observation equipment.

The last German offensive operation during World War II is considered to be the beginning of the introduction of night vision technologies into the military sphere.

The operation had been in the works since January and was intended to be a large-scale offensive. Its goal was to drive back Soviet troops and secure control over two key objects - the Hungarian oil fields and the road to Austria. In 1945, these oil resources remained the only source of fuel for the Wehrmacht, and Austria was not only strategically but also ideologically important as Hitler's homeland and a critical region for the Third Reich. That is why the most modern weapons and equipment of the time were involved in the operation.

Although the operation was not decisive on the scale of World War II, it has a special significance as the first documented case of massive combat use of night vision devices. This makes it important in the history of night optics.

The massive and effective use of night vision devices began in 1944, when German troops introduced them into combat. In particular, Pak 40 gun crews were equipped with night vision systems manufactured by AEG. These systems had low reliability and required complex maintenance, but they provided a significant advantage in night battles.

One of the first solutions based on infrared technology was the Sperber FG 1250 night vision device. Its sensitivity was so low that for effective operation, tanks with the FG 1250 were accompanied by SdKfz 250/20 armored personnel carriers equipped with powerful 6 kW Uhu infrared searchlights. One such vehicle provided illumination for five tanks. In addition, Panther command tanks were additionally equipped with 200 W infrared searchlights.

The problems of maneuvering in a complex tactical situation, the increased sensitivity of the phosphor, which caused flashes of light to disable the equipment, all jeopardized the effectiveness of the first night vision devices. However, the Red Army was not ready to confront an enemy that had gained an advantage in night conditions. Even the limited capabilities of early night vision devices allowed the Wehrmacht to inflict significant losses, as Soviet troops had no means of detecting enemy tanks in the dark.

This is in stark contrast to contemporary Russian historiography, which claims that the USSR was a pioneer in night vision and had allegedly been using such technologies since the 1920s. In fact, during Operation Spring Awakening, Soviet troops were defeated in localized night battles without effective means of counteraction. It was only during the storming of Berlin and the crossing of the Oder that the first effective method was applied - the use of anti-aircraft searchlights to blind and detect enemy vehicles at night.

Soviet troops actively used anti-aircraft searchlights to illuminate German equipment. Due to the vulnerability and imperfection of electronics at the time, powerful light radiation often led to equipment failure or complete loss of functionality. Although the Soviets quickly developed primitive but effective methods of countering the enemy's latest technology, the official explanation for the use of searchlights in ground operations was an attempt to demoralize the enemy.

Operation Spring Awakening was a key episode in the history of night vision devices. It demonstrated the decisive advantage of the ability to navigate in the dark and determined the future direction of military technology development. Control over night operations has become a critical success factor on the battlefield.

However, the unsuccessful German offensive was not the first practical application of night vision devices. As early as 1944, engineers developed prototypes of infrared sights, including the Zielgerät 1229 (ZG.1229) "Vampir" designed for MP-44/1 assault rifles. These systems looked promising, but their technical characteristics significantly limited their combat effectiveness.

The night vision kit weighed more than 5 pounds. However, the main load was created by a battery in a wooden case, which the soldier carried in his backpack - it weighed 30 pounds. This battery powered the infrared spotlight, while a separate battery in another bag powered the sight itself.

The range of the device did not exceed 100 yards, but the advantage it provided in night conditions was so significant that the troops actively used it during night raids. The first batch consisted of only 300 units, but the technology's promise was recognized as high, and the German command prioritized further development in this area.

These systems were tested on the Eastern Front and adapted for MG34 and MG42 machine guns. Sniper groups actively used the devices, causing panic among Soviet troops. Reports of the time mention "snipers who hunted the enemy at night, using large, lightless spotlights mounted on equally cumbersome telescopic sights." The effect of the actions of such groups was not only lethal, but also psychologically demoralizing.

German troops used not only high-tech means to fight at night, but also simpler solutions. One of them was Tripflare, a pyrotechnic charge that was set up as a tripwire. When triggered, it illuminated the area, warning the guards of intrusion. Tripflare was cheap, easy to operate, and effective - in particular, during the battles near the Rapido River, when these systems thwarted a surprise attack by the enemy.

Although the Japanese army did not introduce advanced technologies, it developed its own tactics of night combat, which were actively used in the Pacific theater of operations. These techniques were systematized in the so-called "Red Books," which contained detailed instructions for action in difficult weather conditions and low visibility. The Japanese carefully guarded this knowledge, considering it a universal approach to night combat. However, after the loss of trained personnel, the effectiveness of these techniques declined sharply. This emphasized the limitations of tactical decisions without the support of technical means of detecting targets in the dark.

We looked at the initial stage of development of the technology that radically changed approaches to warfare and the strategy of using troops. We are talking about the so-called "zero generation" of night vision devices, which became the basis for further breakthroughs in the industry. Even at an early stage, these systems demonstrated significant potential and became the starting point for the creation of modern high-tech devices, which will be discussed below.